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mE DEMAND FOR FOOD IN A WEALTHIER, MORE POPULOUS WORLD· 
Estimating the world's human "carrying capacity" has intrigued the minds of men since even 
before the time, 200 years ago, when Malthus (1798) wrote his famous Essay on the Principle of 
Population, and, as might be expected, their conclusions have varied greatly. In his fascinating survey of 
the subject, Joel Cohen (1995:402-418) documents no fewer than 66 such inquiries, some serious, others 
less so, whose verdicts ranged from a half billion persons to an even 1,000 billion (Table I). Among the 
more serious, E. G. Ravenstein (1891) in 1890, when global population was of the order of 1.5 billion, 
reckoned that there remained the potential to support another 4.5 billion. This was in a paper offered to the 
Geographical and Economic Sections of the British Association, and since much of the potentially 
productive land envisioned by Ravenstein lay in the tropics, those present went on to debate whether 
Europeans could survive for prolonged periods in such regions, there "to teach the natives the dignity of 
labor, and to lead him on to a higher plane of civilization" (Ravenstein 1891:31). Thirty-seven years later, 
at the first congress of the International Society of Soil Science, Penck (1928:108) calculated that food 
could be produced for almost 16 billion people; and 50 years after that Roger Revelle (1976: 177) put the 
figure at 40 billion, if a high-starchy-staple-ratio diet of 2,500 calories daily were assumed. 
Revelle's estimate was one of a number made in the mid-1970s, a time of heightened interest in 
agricultural matters because of the just-ended "World Food Crisis." Two others made about the same time 
are of interest because ofthe authors' competence and because they spelled out their methodologies in some 
detail. Colin Clark (1968), for many years Director of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute at 
Oxford, computed the amount of land per person needed to produce the ingredients of various diets. Using 
climate as the constraining factor, he calculated that sufficient land existed to support 47 billion people at 
the dietary level enjoyed in the United States in the 1960s-say, per capita availabilities of 3,250 kcals., of 
which 39 percent were derived from animal products and 22 percent from the starchy staples-or 157 
billion people if the high-starchy-staple-ratio diet experienced by the Japanese people immediately after the 
war were postulated (Clark 1968:153). 
Buringh and his associates (1975) in the Tropical Soil Science Department of the Agricultural 
University in Wageningen, The Netherlands, based their calculations on soils and their potential and 
expressed their findings in terms of grain equivalents. They calculated the world's maximum production 
potential to be of the order of 50 billion metric tons, but reduced this to 32.5 billion tons on the grounds 
that prevailing dietary patterns required only 65 percent of the cultivated area to be planted to cereals. This 
being 23 times the actual level of cereal production-I,400 million tons in 1974-76-it followed that the 
maximum number of people the world could feed was 23 times the then number of 4.1 billion: 93 billion 
people. 
Apart from demonstrating that the world's food producing potential is huge, the usefulness of such 
calculations is questionable. Ofnecessity they incorporate heroic assumptions regarding land use, potential 
yields, and price incentives-assumptions which cannot be verified until long after the conclusions are 
forgotten. Further, no one seriously argues today that population growth is not amenable to control and 
that the number of people computed by Revelle, Clark, or Buringh will ever need to be fed. The approach 
to discussing the world's long-term ability to feed itself should therefore be the inverse of that 
conceptualized by Malthus. He reasoned that populations would increase to whatever whatever limit was 
­
set by the supply of food. Today it is far more realistic to take expected levels of population as the given 
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and to consider whether the supply of food can be made to increase sufficiently to sustain them at whatever 
dietary level their income would warrant. 
The first step, then, is to project demand, and the aim ofthis paper is to offer a simple methodology 
for doing this. More specifically, I will focus on a simple technique for quantifying the impact rising 
income will have on per capita demand. For just as rapidly growing population was the principal factor 
driving the huge growth in demand during the latter half of the 20th century, so rising incomes will be the 
chiefpropellant during the first 50 years ofthe 21 st• 
Table I. Selected Estimates of the Number of People the Earth Could Support 
Billion Year of 
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Year of 
Estimate Princi al Author 
1679 Leeuwenhoek 
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Source: Cohen, Joel E. 1995. How Many People Can the Earth Support? New York: Norton. 
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The Population Component 
The population statistics are well known. The world's population remained essentially stable from 
biblical times to about 1650, when it stood at perhaps .5 billion. It reached 1 billion by 1800 and by 1950 
stood at 2.5 billion, two-thirds of whom lived in the developing countries. There followed a half century of 
population explosion and in 1999 the world's population passed the 6 billion mark, a 2.5-fold increase in 
just 50 years; of these 6 billion, 90 percent are residents of developing ~untries. Though the population 
will continue to grow by about 80 million annually for the next two decades, it seems clear that the great 
population explosion will draw near to an end in most parts ofthe world by 2050. 
The demographic transition-the process whereby a country's population moves from stability at a 
low level to a similar state with much higher absolute numbers-is among the best documented trends in 
recent history, its operation having been demonstrated in literally hundreds of investigations. In England, 
one ofthe better documented countries, the transition required almost 200 years, from 1750 to 1950, to run 
its course, during which time the population rose eight-fold, from 5 million to over 40 million (Figure 1). 
Even though the transition did not begin in earnest until about 1950 in most of today's developing 
countries, enough time has passed for it to be evident that it need no longer be such a lengthy process. 
Birth rates are falling with unprecedented rapidity in the economically dynamic countries of Asia's 
Pacific Rim (Figure 2). In Singapore only 15 years were needed for it to fall from 40 per thousand to less 
than 20; one-tenth the time required in England. The decline in Hong Kong has been equally dramatic, as 
has been the drop in China. Even prior to promulgation of China's one-ehild-per-family target in the late 
1970s the rate had dropped within a decade to a little over 20 per thousand. 
Less spectacular, but nonetheless steady has been the decline in Latin America. By the early 1990s 
the birth rate had fallen below 25 per thousand for the region as a whole, whereas it was half again as much 
in the 1970s. Cuba, of course, has been the pacesetter, but Brazil no longer lags too far behind and the 
fertility rate in Mexico now stands at about 2.5 children per woman whereas it was almost three times that 
in 1965 (Dillon 1999). 
Most of the world, as a consequence, can look forward to something approaching population 
stability within the next 50 years. The only exceptions are Sub-Saharan Africa and the Islamic countries of 
Western Asia and North Africa. In most of the Moslem countries the decline in births has thus far been 
relatively modest, while it is not an exaggeration to say that it has hardly begun to fall in the heart of 
Africa. 
The outlook therefore is for population growth to continue in Africa well after it has been 
contained elsewhere. The medium variants of the projections prepared by the United Nations, the World 
Bank, and the U.S. Census Bureau all suggest that after 2025 between a third and a half of global 
population growth will be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Mrica. To this forecast demographers invariably 
add an important caveat: the AIDS epidemic raging in the eastern and southern parts of the continent. 
Because AIDS is heterosexually transmitted in Africa and most Africans lack access to preventive 
measures or medical facilities, many observers fear that its impact on population growth will become 
increasingly pronounced. Indeed, some go so far as to predict that in such badly affiicted countries as 
Uganda population trends may switch by 2010 from their present high rate of growth to an actual decrease 
in numbers. 
-
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Figure 1. The Demographic Transition in England, 1700-1990 
Adapted from Weeks, J. R. 1992. Population: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues. 
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co.:145. 
Figure 2. Birth Rate Declines in Selected Countries and Regions, 1950-55 to 1985-90 
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Regional Population Prospects 
The most recent UN projections (1999) put the global population in 2050 at between 7.3 billion 
and 10.7 billion. If future growth follows the path delineated by the medium-variant projection, near 
stability should be attained at a level of slightly less than 9 billion persons, 90 percent of whom will reside 
in what are now the developing countries. Today's developed countries will grow not at all, the 100 million 
increase in the United States being offset by a similar declir1e in Europe (UN 1999). 
Asia will remain the most populous continent, with half again its present population, and 
East/Southeast Asia and South Asia will each harbor about a quarter ofmankind, between 2 and 2.5 billion 
people. China and India will remain the most populous countries, each having about 1.5 billion 
inhabitants. 
The population of Latin America is projected to level out at rather less than twice its current level: 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 800 million. The medium projection for Mexico is 147 million, half 
again what it is today. Rather greater rates of growth are foreseen for the Islamic belt of countries, 
considerably above what might be expected from the region's income per capita. The literature is 
surprisingly silent on the reasons for this, but the tenants of the Muslim faith, particularly regarding 
women's place in society, doubtless playa role. 
The great unknown, to repeat, is Sub-Saharan Africa. If the medium variants come to pass, rapid 
growth will continue well after 2050 and not stabilize until it reaches about 2.3 billion, four times its 1995 
level. 
Ifsuch numbers give weight to the pessimism ofmodem-day Malthusians, they tell only part of the 
story. The demand for agricultural products reflects not just the number of mouths that must be fed, but 
also the type of diet they will be able to afford. Rising incomes and dietary change are likely to pose a 
considerably greater challenge to agriculture in the future than does population growth. 
Incorporating the Impact of Income Growth 
To project the demands on agriculture any future population may pose requires a number of 
simplifying assumptions. Ideally demand should be expressed in terms of the multitude of individual 
conunodities which make up the global agricultural economy. For the short term and for countries with 
reliable statistics, this is possible to estimate, but not easily. Globally and for the long run, it presents 
impossible challenges. 
A first simplification, therefore, is to think in aggregate rather than individual conunodity terms 
and to express this aggregate demand as calories per person per day. Past experience is not an unreliable 
indicator ofwhat this will be at various income levels. 
The second simplification is to incorporate the impact of the income/dietary change relationship by 
distinguishing between calories consumed directly (final calories) and those needed to feed the animals 
which convert them into the meat, dairy products, and eggs ultimately consumed. This latter figure may be 
­thought of as indirect, or primary, calories, and obviously varies with the final product and the conditions 
under which it is produced, but it depends above all on the percentage of final calories in the diet derived 
from animal products, a figure easy to conceptualize and calculate from food balance sheets. 
It should not be thought, however, that the total of direct and indirect calories so calculated will 
yield a precise estimate of the future demand for food. Much is ignored, notably the pulses, fats and oils, 
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sugar, fruits and vegetables, and no account is taken of the contribution of tree crops, pasture and fisheries. 
But this total of direct and indirect calories, especially when expressed in tenns of millions of tons of grain 
equivalents, gives us a measure by which to express relative magnitudes and in this way note the likely 
impact of future trends in population and income. 
Even if future populations are taken as givens and precision in the forecast is not expected, three 
problems warrant exploration before attempting to project grain equivalent demand. One concern is the 
income figures to use. So that some comparability between countries may be achieved, it is necessary to 
convert incomes into a common currency, and alternative approaches to such conversions exist. A second 
set of problems deals with the relationships between income and diet. These are not uniform around the 
world. Body size, climate, and activity patterns can have an impact on the apparent consumption of direct 
calories, as can dietary taboos (such as vegetarianism) on the proportion of calories derived from animal 
products. Finally, there is the matter of the energy conversion ratio to use in estimating the primary energy 
needed to feed livestock. Such ratios differ from one product to another, within countries depending on 
mailagement practices, and from one part of the world to another. 
Converting Income to a Common Currency 
The conventional practice for converting the world's many currencies into a common one, usually 
U.S. dollars, is to use the prevailing market exchange rates. Such conversions, however, need not 
necessarily reflect differences in actual purchasing power. Recent work has shown that most developing 
countries have incomes which can actually purchase quantities of goods and services several times greater 
than that which exchange rate conversions suggest is the case. 
The reason market exchange rates are imperfect converters of income into a common currency is 
that while such rates tend to equalize prices of internationally traded goods, big differences can and do 
remain in the prices of nontraded goods and services. Developing countries tend to have cheaper 
services-domestic help is the classic example-than developed ones and countries in the former Soviet 
bloc kept food, housing, and energy artificially cheap. Converting these countries' GOP using market 
exchange rates therefore has the effect of systematically understating their real output and income. 
The International Comparison Program (ICP) sponsored by the United Nations attempts to correct 
for these biases by collecting and comparing prices for over 1,500 commodities, services, and labor inputs 
representing the universe of items priced in a country. The price comparisons that emerge are then 
aggregated into an overall purchasing-power-parity (PPP) figure used to relate income to a common 
currency unit (Summers and Heston 1991). ICP estimates of per capita GOP converted into US dollars 
using PPP conversions have been available in several forms since 1989, the most complete being the Penn 
World Table (PWT), an annex ,to Summers and Heston (1991). The versions of that table used here, 
PWT (Mark 5.5) and PWT (Mark 5.6) were released in 1993 and 1995, respectively, cover the years 1950 
through 1992 for most countries, and have 1985 as the base year (PWT 5.5 1993; PWT 5.6 1995). 
The picture the PPP conversions paint of the global economy is strikingly different from that 
conveyed ifmarket exchange rates are used. The developing countries' share ofworld output circa 1990 as 
calculated by the International Monetary Fund jumps from 18 to 34 percent, while that of the industrialized 
countries drops from 73 percent to 54 (IMF 1993). The countries of the former Soviet block account for ­
the remainder. China becomes the world's second or third biggest economy and India moves up to fifth 
place. Some country comparisons as of 1985 are shown in Table 2. In all instances the PPP conversion 
points to per capita incomes considerably above those suggested by exchange rate conversions, typically by 
a factor of three or four among the poorest countries. (As countries become wealthier-and more involved 
in the global economy-the differences between the two conversions lessen.) Such figures may seem overly 
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large to those accustomed to thinking of the typical third-worlder as being dirt-poor, but this in no way 
diminishes their validity. 
The Linkage Between. Income and Diet Composition 
Although in physical appearance they may differ markedly, the diets of poor people the world over 
have a number of things in common. One is that a high proportion of the dietary energy and a fair share of 
the protein will come from foods composed principally of starch. These "starchy staples" are the cereals 
and the starchy fruits, roots, and tubers. Depending on the staple, this dietary cornerstone will either be 
served steamed or boiled (as with rice and potatoes), a leavened (wheat) or unleavened (maize) bread, or as 
a doughy past or stiff porridge (cassava, yams, and plantains). It will normally be accompanied by side 
dishes or sauces, which, in addition to adding flavor to an otherwise bland meal, will contribute 
considerable protein and the bulk of the fat, vitamin, and mineral content. A second characteristic of poor 
people's diets is that the protein in these sauces and side dishes will tend to be more vegetable than animal 
in origin. Thus the nutritional rationale underlying the traditional Mexican diet of tortillas andfrijoles. 
The starchy staples dominate the diets of the poor everywhere for a very simple reason: their 
cheapness, whether expressed in terms of market price or production cost. Far less land and far less labor 
are typically needed to produce a thousand calories of energy value in the form of the starchy staples than 
in the form of any other foodstuff. Meat and vegetables by comparison are inefficient converters: 
vegetables because their calorie content is low, meat because an animal must be fed between two and ten 
pounds ofgrain for it to produce a pound ofedible product. 
As wealth increases the contribution of the starchy foods falls and a still largely vegetarian diet 
becomes more diversified; this is Bennett's Law, observed in the 1930s by M. K. Bennett (1941; 1954:165­
168), the pioneering student of world food economics. Then products of animal origin-meat, eggs, and 
Table 2. Per Capita Income (SUS 1985) Computed by Market Exchange Rates and
 
Purchasing Power Parity, Selected Countries, 1985
 
Per Capita Income (SUS 1985) 
GNP Market Exchange Purchasing Power Parity 
India 270 1,116 
China 310 1,811 
Ghana 380 759 
Egypt 610 1,859 
Thailand 800 2,422 
Brazil 1,640 3,951 
Venezuela 3,080 6,037 
Singapore 7,420 8,153 
Canada 13,680 15,695 
Purchasing-power-parity GDP per capita figures are expressed n 1985 U.S. dollars and are from: 
-Penn World Table (Mark 5.5). 1993. Annex to Summers, Robert and A. Heston. 1991. "The Penn World Table 
.....(Mark 5): An Expanded Set ofIntemational Comparisons, 1950-1988." Quarterly Journal o/Economics. May. 
Exchange rate figures are from: World Bank 1987. World Development Report. 1987. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
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dairy products-begin to play an increasingly important role in the diet, supplementing or replacing the 
vegetable protein, and the consumption of sugars, fats and oils, and fruits and vegetables rises. This 
dietary evolution seems to be universal, although the exact modifications which take place will vary in 
accordance with local circumstances such as market availability and price and cultural considerations such 
as religious taboos. 
Figure 3 illustrates how this course of dietary change is related to income and where the various 
countries of the world stood in the progression as of 1984-86, as reported in the food balance sheets 
published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 1991). Average per capita incomes are 
expressed in terms of 1985 U.S. dollars and were calculated using purchasing-power-parity rather than 
exchange-rate conversions. Incomes of the order of SUS 8,000, or about half that then prevailing in the 
United States, were sufficient to complete the dietary transition. 
In the poorest countries, where incomes average SUS 1,000 or less, the percentage contribution of 
the starchy staples to total energy availabilities-the starchy staple ratio-can approach or even exceed 80 
percent. It then drops rapidly as countries attain middle-income status. With incomes in the SUS 3,000­
4,000 range, ratios of 50-60 percent are the rule. Thereafter, location and diet influence the extent to which 
the starchy staple ratio will fall. In Mexico where average PPP income in the rnid-1980s was of the order 
of SUS 5,300 the ratio was 49 percent; in 1997 it had fallen only two points, to 47 percent-a rather 
depressing commentary on the state ofthe Mexican economy in recent years (FAO 1999). 
With products of animal origin the direction of change induced by income growth is, of course, in 
the opposite direction. At very low income levels even fewer than five percent of the calories in the diet 
will derive from such products, whereas in the wealthy countries of Europe and North America the range is 
from 30 to 40 percent. 
Accompanying these changes in diet composition is an increase in total energy availabilities. In the 
poorest countries, the balance sheet calculation suggests this can be as low as 2,000 kcal. per person per 
day, although this may well understate reality. As incomes increase it rises rapidly to 3,500 kcal., where it 
levels out in all parts of the world except the Far East. 
It is evident that while the broad course of dietary evolution holds for all countries, few of them 
follow exactly the progression of change suggested by the trend lines shown in Figure 3. The deviations are 
attributable to a number offactors (Sanderson 1995): 
•	 A country's agricultural resource endowment. (1) 
•	 The extent to which the market is distorted by governmental manipulation of prices and 
trade. (2) 
•	 The degree to which the health hazards associated with the consumption of particular 
foods, especially animal products, are known to a population. (3) 
•	 The pervasiveness ofdietary taboos. (4) 
-

•	 A lag in dietary change associated with very rapid income growth. (5) 
•	 The pervasive role of rice in some Asian diets. (6) 
•	 Differences in the body size, age distribution, and activity patterns of a population. (7) 
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Figure 3. Indicators of Dietary Change Related to Purchasing-Power-Parity GOP Per Capita, Selected Countries, About 1985 
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Thus, the "excess" consumption of animal products in Poland, Hungary, and the former USSR can be 
attributed to (2), meat products having been heavily subsidized in the former Soviet block of countries, 
whereas in Argentina, Ireland, and Denmark, lands abundantly endowed with pasture, it doubtless is a 
reflection of (l). Lower than expected utilization of animal products in Korea may in part be explained by 
(5), in part by (6). Indeed, these factors, plus (7), would appear to go far toward explaining why the 
countries of East and Southeast Asia demonstrate the greatest deviations from the expected dietary changes 
associated with rising incomes. 
For the projection of demand over the long term, the problem is less whether these factors impact 
on the course of the dietary transition, but whether their deviant effects are temporary or lasting. Figure 4 
is instructive in this connection. In it are plotted individual country trends for the years 1964-66, 1969-71, 
1974-76, 1979-81, and 1984-86. The income figures are for the mid-year of these averages and again are 
PPP conversions expressed in constant 1985 U.S. dollars. The hand-fitted trend lines from Figure 3 are 
reproduced in the individual panels. 
Developed Countries. All the developed countries plotted in the panels on the extreme left have 
passed through the dietary transition and, with the notable exception of Japan, display similar dietary 
features. In all the starchy staple ratio has dropped to the neighborhood of 20-22 percent and the apparent 
consumption of final calories has leveled out at about 3,500 kcal. There is, however, conflicting evidence 
as to where the ultimate contribution of animal products stabilizes. Denmark-where dairy and fishery 
products loom particularly Jarg~is clearly an anomaly at 45 percent. But it is by no means certain 
whether considerations of health and the substitution of vegetable for animal fats in the diet will bring it to 
the 33-34 percent range found in North America or whether it will remain at the 37-39 percent level 
prevailing in the principal European countries. 1be trend in the United Kingdom suggests the former 
eventuality, whereas the French and German evidence points to the latter. 
In Japan the percentage of calories from animal products is at any given income appreciably below 
what the Western model would predict and the starchy staple ratio higher. Per capita disappearance of 
final calories in Japan also stabilizes well below the expected level. Of the various explanations that have 
been offered for the former two deviations, I suspect the most important is (2), the price of food being 
inordinately high in Japan. 1bat the domestic price of rice ranges between six and eight times that 
prevailing on the world market is well known, and to purchase animal protein in a Tokyo restaurant is to 
risk financial as well as digestive distress. Both reflect policies designed to protect the Japanese farmer 
from overseas competition. 
East and Southeast Asia. The deviations from the Western model found in Japan are also 
displayed in the other East and Southeast Asian countries plotted in the next set of panels. Whereas daily 
apparent consumption offinal calories levels out at ±3,500 Kcal. in the West, the figure is more like 2,800­
3,000 Kcal. in the Far East. Smaller body size and reduced wastage, particularly of anirnal fats lost in 
cooking, doubtless account for these particular differences, but other factors are probably also at work. 
One is (6), the pervasive role played by rice in the region's dietary. In both Singapore and Hong Kong, 
from the point of view of dietary evolution the most advanced countries in the Far East, the decline in the 
starchy staple ratio appears to falter in the range of 35-38 percent, while the contribution of animal 
products seems to go no higher than the neighborhood of 30 percent. So long as rice remains the 
cornerstone of most horne-prepared meals in the Far East, such figures may well represent the final stage of 
-

the dietary transition. Otherwise, the data for East and Southeast Asia offer telling confirmation of the 
impact rapid economic growth can have on dietary change. 
South Asia. Incomes are still too low in the South Asian countries plotted for us to know whether 
the East and Southeast Asia pattern will be replicated there. Because of smaller body size apparent 
consumption of energy may level out at the same 2,800-3,000 Kcal. level. As to the impact of dietary 
11 Figure 4. Indicators of Dietary Change Related to Per Capita GDP, Selected Countries by Region, About 1965. 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 
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taboos, especially vegetarianism, one can only speculate. At present its effects are clearly significant; at 
similar income levels the percentage contribution of livestock products to the Indian diet stands at about 
half the figure for Pakistan. But it can be argued that the prevalence of vegetarianism in India is less a 
matter of religious dictate than of making a virtue of necessity, and that with wealth it will be practiced by 
a declining element of the population. 
Southwest Asia and North Africa!Latin America. In Latin America and the predominantly Muslim 
countries of Southwest Asia and North Africa the Western model would appear to be holding. The 
substitution of livestock products for starchy staples seems to be on course and in the wealthier countries 
average per capita daily energy disappearance approaching 3,500 Kcal. The operation of (2) governmental 
policy, is particularly evident in these regions. In Egypt, for instance, the consumer price of staple foods is 
heavily subsidized, while animal products command whatever the market will bear. The result is an 
abnormally high starchy staple ratio and apparent consumption of energy rather greater than in other 
countries with similar incomes. These policies had their origin in rationing programs introduced during the 
Second World War. Though expensive and much criticized by international lenders, they have become 
such a part of Egyptian life that it is unlikely they can be modified in the foreseeable future. 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Only data for 1964-66 and 1989-91 are plotted in the panels for Sub­
Saharan Africa. It is not just that the figures are of questionable accuracy; incomes have grown so little 
and changes in diet have been so modest that to show the intervening years would serve only to obfuscate. 
About all that can be said is that the dietary transition has hardly begun in this unfortunate part of the 
world. But when it does there is every reason to believe it will track the Western experience; Africans and 
Westerners are of a similar body size and their taste for livestock products is similarly unhampered by 
various proscriptions. 
Feed Utilization Efficiencies 
Finally, there is the question of the relationship to be employed in linking the final calories 
consumed in the form of livestock products to the indirect, or primary, calories needed to feed the animals. 
After fiddling with this problem on and off for a couple of years, I confess to defeat and employ in the 
calculations which follow the rather arbitrary ratio of 6: I. 
The ability of livestock to convert feedstuffs into edible product is usually expressed as a ratio 
between the feed required and output ofproduct, expressed in units either of weight or nutritive component. 
These ratios vary greatly among animal types, as Figure 5 illustrates. Whereas it takes only one pound of 
feed to produce a pound of milk on dairy farms in the United States, nine pounds are required for a pound 
of on-foot beef produced in a feedlot. Broilers, on the other hand, require 2.1 pounds of feed per pound of 
weight gain. 
Such ratios are legitimate indices of the efficiency with which animals of a specific age, quality, 
and conditioning will produce food during a period of feeding, but are not good indices of overall 
efficiency. They ignore the inputs needed to rear and maintain young stock, breeding animals, cows not in 
milk, and losses from infertility and mortality, all of which can be substantial (Reid 1975). The ratios are 
also quite specific as to the feedstuffs and management practices they assume. They do not pretend to be 
­averages, national or otherwise, and we do not have the evidence on herd composition and feeding practices 
needed to compute such averages. In the circumstances, much guesswork is called for. 
FAO (1996:32) has suggested the ratios shown in Table 3 for global-application and a commonly 
employed rule of thumb is that a mixed animal population will convert plant material into edible product 
with an efficiency of 20 percent; that is, at a ratio of 5: I (Chrispeels and Sadava 1977:76). Sanderson 
13
 
Figure S. Pounds of Feed Required to Proouce One Pound of
 
On-Foot Product in the United States, c. 1990
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Table 3. Feeding Efficiency Ratios Suggested by FAO for Global Application 
Plant-Derived Calories needed to proouce 1 Calorie of
 
11 beef
 
11 mutton
 
8 milk
 
4 pork
 
4 poultry 
4 egg 
Data from FAO. 1996. ''Requirements and Population Growth." World Food Summit 
Technical Paper 10. Provision Version. June. 
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(1988:197) has refined this by suggesting that, because of differences in herd makeup and management 
practices, 7:1 is a more appropriate figure for countries in the Western Hemisphere, 5:1 for South and East 
Asia, and 6: I for the rest of the world. Beyond that one treads with caution. Food balance sheets are of 
little help in calculating ratios for individual countries: the computation ignores the contribution of pasture 
and aquatic matter, and merely indicates that the availability of feedstuffs derived from the starchy staples 
and oilseeds rises as livestock consumption increases, but does so in no consistent manner from country to 
country. 
About all that can be said in defense of the 6: I efficiency ratio used here is that it is within the 
range of the conventional wisdom and that if it errs it probably does so on the side of conservatism. For 
projecting future demand it is preferable to exaggerate the future challenges confronting global agriculture 
than to minimize them. 
Projecting Demand in 2025 and 2050 
I now take leave of the world of reality and offer for your consideration my projections of demand 
to the years 2025 and 2050. These years were chosen not just because 2050 is the farthest year 
demographers can go without excessive flights of fancy; it also approximates the time when population 
stability is anticipated in most of the world save Africa. 2025 is chosen because the greatest population 
and income spurs are anticipated between now and then. If the world can get through the next 25 years, the 
rest should be comparatively easy. 
In making these projections I confess that I will be violating several of the precepts I have 
endeavored to teach Cornell students for the past 36 years. One is to never project beyond a reasonable 
number of years: say five or ten. The other is never to project a single figure into the future, but rather a 
reasonable and justifiable range, including a high and low estimate of what conceivably might happen. I 
ignore these precepts in the hope that despite the limitations of the projections they may reveal something 
instructive. 
My assumptions regarding income and its impact on dietary change, region by region, are detailed 
in Appendix Table 2 and summarized in Table 4. Incorporated into these tables are the UN's 1998 
medium population projections. 1985 is taken as the base year because that was the latest year for which 
food balance sheets had been published by FAO in 1995 when I prepared the dietary change charts in 
Figures 3 and 4 and was the base year for the Penn World Table.! 
The assumptions on which the data for 1985 shown in the left column of Table 4 are based are 
shown in Table 5. The per capita daily energy availabilities and the percentage of calories from animal 
products are from the FAO food balance sheets; the per capita income figures are from the Penn World 
Table. 
The computation for the developed countries can serve as an example. Apparent per capita daily 
energy consumption was reported to be 3,366 kilocalories, of which 30 percent were derived from animal 
products. Assuming a conversion ratio for livestock products of 6:1, the 1,010 kilocalories of animal 
-

! When, some 18 months ago, Dr. Higuera asked me to prepare this paper, I had hoped to use a newer version of 
the Penn World Table in my analyses. Release ofPWT (Mark 5.7), which carries the data beyond 1992 and uses 
1990 as its base year was then described as "imminent." But at the time of writing, a year later (July 1999), 
"unforeseen technical difficulties" had still precluded its release. Soon, however, ·it should be released and will 
enable others to update my work, especially since FAO now makes its most recent food balance sheets available on 
the web via FAOSTAT (http://apps.fao.org) with considerable dispatch; balance sheets for 1997 were released in 
June 1999. 
Table 4. Summary ofthe Assumptions and Calculations Used in the Demand Projections 
1985 2000 2025 2050 
GDPlCapita P.C. GOP/capita P.C. GOP/capita P.C. GOP/capita P.C. 
(PPP Direct % Animal (PPP Direct % Animal (PPP Direct % Animal (PPP Direct % Animal 
$US 1985) Energy Products $US 1985) Energy Products $US 1985) Energy Products $US 1985) Energy Products 
World - Total 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Developed - Total 10,000 3,366 30 10,000+ 3,500 34 10,000+ 3,500 34 10,000+ 3,500 34 
Developing - Total 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
E&SEAsia 2,000 2,500 10 3,600 2,700 15 9,602 3,000 30 10,000+ 3,000 30 
S. Asia 900 2,143 6 1,211 2,300 8 1,987 2,500 10 3,684 2,800 15 
SW Asia & N. Africa 3,000 3,000 10 4,674 3,200 20 9,786 3,500 34 10,000+ 3,500 34 
Sub~aharan Africa 750 2,200 5 870 2,300 7 1,127 2,600 10 1,848 2,900 15 
Latin America 4,500 3,000 15 7,010 3,500 25 10,000+ 3,500 34 10,000+ 3,500 34 
MMT MMT MMT MMT 
Total Daily Grain Total Daily Grain Total Daily Grain Total Daily Grain 
P.C. Energy Utilization Equiva- P.C. Energy Equiva- P.C. Energy Equiva- P.C. Energy Equiva­
lent Utilization lent Utilization lent Utilization lent 
World - Total 
-
2,606 
-
3,803 
-
6,258 
-
7,316 
Developed - Total 9,425 1,159 10,640 1,318 10,640 1,514 10,640 1,383 
Developing - Total 
-
1,447 
-
2,485 
-
4,744 
-
6,933 
E&SEAsia 4,000 638 6,130 1,005 8,400 2,019 8,400 2,078 
SAsia 2,914 322 3,404 531 4,000 850 6,320 1,203 
SW Asia & N Africa 4,800 120 7,040 249 10,640 606 10,640 879 
Sub~aharan Africa 2,860 130 3,266 230 4,160 608 6,510 875 
Latin America 6,700 237 8,750 470 10,640 761 10,640 898 
Data are from Appendix Table 2. 
l I 
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Table 5. Estimates for 1985 of Per Capita Income, Apparent Direct Daily Energy Consumption, and
 
Percentage of Calories Derived from Animal Products, by Region.
 
Per Capita 
Developed - Total 
Developing - Total 
East & Southeast Asiab 
South Asiac 
SW Asia & N. Africad 
Sub-Saharan Africa· 
Latin Americaf 
GNP 
(1985 SUS) 
10,000' 
2,000 
900 
3,000 
750 
4,500 
Apparent Daily Direct
 
Energy Consumption
 
(Kea!) 
3,366 
2,500 
2,143 
3,000 
2,200 
3,000 
Percentage
 
Calories from
 
Animal Products
 
30 
10 
6 
10 
5 
15 
Sources: Either taken directly or guessed at from: 
FAO. 1991. Food Balance Sheets. 1984-86Average. Rome. 
Penn World Table (Mark 5.5). 1993. Annex to Summers, Robert and A. Heston. 1991. "The Penn
 
World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set ofIntemational Comparisons, 1950-1988." Quarterly Journal of
 
Economics. May.
 
a The figures for energy availabilities and percent calories from animal products are from the food
 
balance sheet collection. The income estimate is a rounded-up simple average of the figures for the United
 
States ($16,559), USSR ($4,894), France ($12,186), and Poland ($4,204).
 
b The figures for China are $1,811,2,622 Kcal., and 8.8 percent. 
C The figures for India are $899, 2,143 Kcal., and 6.4 percent. 
d The figures for Egypt are $1,859,3,310 Kcal., and 7.5 percent. 
• The figures for Ghana are $759, 2,196 Kcal., and 4.6 percent. 
{The figures for Mexico are $5,289,3,118 Kcal., and 16.9 percent. 
products required primary food energy in the form of feed of 6,059 kilocalories. Total per capita daily 
energy utilization was therefore 9,425 kilocalories. Expressed in terms of yearly energy utilization per 
capita, this is equal to 983 kilograms of grain equivalents, there being roughly 3,500 kilocalories in a 
kilogram of grain. Multiplied by a population of 1, 179 million, the resultant total energy utilization in the 
developed countries was 1,159 million metric tons ofgrain equivalent. 
• 
If we apply the daily energy availabilities and animal product percentages in Table 5 to the other 
regions of the world, the picture which emerges for 1985 is as summarized in Table 6. Apparent energy 
utilization totaled 2,606 million metric tons ofgrain equivalents, 44 percent of it in the developed countries, 
56 percent in the less-developed ones. . 
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Table 6. Estimated Per Capita and Total Energy Utilization, 1985, By Region
 
World - Total 
Developed - Total 
Developing - Total 
. E& SEAsia 
S Asia 
SW Asia & N Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America 
Population 
(millions) 
4,844 
1,179 
3,666 
1,529 
1,058 
239 
435 
399 
Total Daily Per Capita
 
Energy Utilization
 
(Kcal) 
9,425 
4,000 
2,914 
4,800 
2,860 
5,700 
Total Annual Energy
 
Utilization
 
(MMT grain equivalent)
 
2,606
 
1,159
 
1,447
 
638
 
322
 
120
 
130
 
237
 
Source: Appendix Table 2. 
Such a figure is within the realm of the reasonable. Actual grain production in 1984-86 averaged 
1,839 million metric tons, and actual starchy staple production (in grain equivalents), 1,987 million metric 
tons. One would expect calculated utilization expressed in terms of grain equivalents to exceed these totals 
by a considerable margin, but by how great a margin is impossible to say. The calculation assumes all 
livestock are fed, whereas in reality the contribution of grazing and scavenging can be appreciable. Further 
it implies that all nonanimal product calories are supplied directly by the cereals, whereas the global 
starchy ratio was actually about 57 percent, and that all cultivated land is planted to these crops, whereas 
only about two-thirds actually is. Therefore it is important to repeat that these grain equivalent tonnages, 
and those which will be projected subsequently, should not be seen as actual quantities, but as indicators of 
relative magnitude and changes therein. In that sense they are legitimate and the best single indicator of 
global demand for food. 
From this point onwards, the demand projection exercise is pretty much mechanical. All one needs 
do is consult his crystal ball, decide what income levels will obtain in the future, and refer to Charts 3 and 4 
to estimate the likely dietary impact. 
My best guesses as of Spring 1999 were as follows. If some of the assumptions seem optimistic, I 
should explain that they included an input from my students, many of whom were from developing 
countries and understandably reluctant to view the future too darkly. 
Developed Countries. I assumed per capita GDP will continue to grow at 2 percent per annum 
throughout the period, more or less the US postwar experience. Since the dietary transition has ended when 
incomes reach a level of ±$1O,000 (expressed in terms of$US1985 PPP) I do not project incomes beyond 
this level. In the developed countries of the West final calories at this income level out at about 3,500 
Kcal. I assume that the percentage of calories from animal products will, for reasons of health, level out at 
34 percent, the North American experience. 
-

East and Southeast Asia. This is "tiger" country and, despite the setbacks of the past few years, I 
assume a growth rate of 4 percent per annum, which yields an income figure of almost $10,000 in 2025 
and well in excess of it in 2050. The question is at what level calories will level out and what will be the 
percentage derived from livestock products. We have two models: Japan or Hong Kong/Singapore. In 
both, final calories seem to rise no higher than 3,000 Kcal., 500 Kcal. below the Western model. I take this 
18
 
to be a reflection of smaller body size. In Japan the percentage of final calories from livestock products is 
now ±20 percent, whereas in Hong Kong/Singapore it seems to level out at 30 percent. I take the latter 
figure as being applicable to Asia in the long term; Japan is home to a set of food policies which will 
probably not prove durable. 
South Asia. This part of the world seems to be getting its economic house in order and I project 
the so-called "Hindu" rate ofgrowth of 2 percent per annum to 2025, rising to 2.5 percent thereafter. This 
yields incomes of ±S2,000 in 2025 and S3,700 in 2050. I also project the East Asian direct energy 
maximum of 3,000 Kcal. will apply to South Asia; body size is similar. This yields 2,500 Kcal. in 2025; 
2,800 Kcal. in 2050. Vegetarianism is common in South Asia. Whether it will endure into more 
prosperous times or simply makes a virtue of necessity among the poor for now is a much debated topic. 
Knowing little of Eastern metaphysics, I looked out the window and postulated 10 percent from animal 
products in 2025; 15 percent in 2050, rather below what would obtain were it not for vegetarianism. 
SW Asia and North Africa. Income growth in the Islamic belt of countries has varied a great deal 
in the past, in part because of the changing fortunes of the petroleum industry. I assume-arbitrarily, but 
optimistically-3 percent growth throughout the period. This yields incomes of almost SIO,OOO in 2025 
and much above it in 2050. The Islamic countries seem to be following the Western path of dietary 
evolution and this is what I project. 
East and West Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is the economic and political sick man of the world. 
Growth has been negligible or even negative since these states achieved independence. I project a I-percent 
growth rate through 2025,2 percent thereafter. This yields incomes ofSl,127 (2025) and SI,850 (2050). 
Apparent direct calories are 2,600 Kcal. and 2,900 Kcal. The percentage of calories from livestock follows 
the Western pattern: 10 percent (2025) and 15 percent (2050). 
Latin America. The 1980s were a bad time for Latin America. But with the debt crisis largely a 
thing of the past and Brazil and Mexico striving toward economic stability, I assume a 3 percent growth 
rate through 2025, 2 percent thereafter. This yields incomes in excess ofSlO,OOO by 2025. Latin America 
seems to be following the Western course of dietary change, so: 
Apparent direct calories: 3,500 Kcal. in both years 
Percentage from livestock: 34 percent in both years. 
Conclusions 
The conclusions I draw from these assumptions are summarized in the three right-hand columns of 
Table 4 and illustrated graphically in Figure 6. The top graph in this figure shows the impact of projected 
population growth; the bottom one the combined impact of population and income change. Several things 
are immediately apparent: 
•	 First, that the next 50 years will witness hardly any changes in the developed countries of 
today 
•	 Second, that while the population of today's developing countries will increase by half again 
­during the next 50 years, their demand for food will grow by a factor of almost two and a half. 
•	 In East and Southeast Asia and in South Asia this increase in agricultural demand will occur 
mainly during the next 25 years; while in the Islamic countries and Sub-Saharan Africa the 
greatest upsurge will take place after 2025. 
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Figure 6. World Population and Computed Direct and Indirect Energy 
Utilization, 1985,2000,2025, and 2050, By Region 
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These differences in timing and magnitude are more clearly shown in Table 7, which is designed to 
emphasize relative magnitudes, since this is what the methodology is designed to reveal. 
•	 Latin America. Although population growth is beginning to taper off in Latin America,
 
incomes are at the stage where dietary change is most rapid. The challenges to agriculture this
 
poses will be greatest during the next Quarter century.
 
•	 East and Southeast Asia. Rather the same situation obtains in the economically dynamic
 
countries of East and Southeast Asia, although population growth there is slowing more
 
dramatically. The next 25 years will witness the most significant increases in demand.
 
•	 South Asia. In India and its neighbors the turn down in population growth is less in evidence,
 
as are sharp increases in income. Demand will continue to grow through at least 2050.
 
•	 The greatest challenges to agriculture will clearly take place in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the
 
Islamic countries of North Africa and the Middle East. In both regions the projections suggest
 
growth in demand of the order of 3.5- to 4-fold, and because incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa
 
will still be so low at mid-eentury that the latter half of the century will continue to see a rapid
 
growth in demand.
 
The Challenge Ahead 
The obvious Question is: Does global agriculture have the capability of meeting this upsurge in 
demand? My response to students who asked my opinion was that I was optimistic-with a few important 
caveats. I based this conclusion in part on agriculture's record since the end of the Second World War. 
FAD's indices of total and per capita food production (Figure 7) indicate that production in the developing 
countries has increased rather more rapidly than in the developed ones and that in all regions of the world 
save Sub-Saharan Africa output per capita has grown despite the huge upsurge in population. 
I also called their attention to Figure 8, in which are plotted the production, acreage, and yields of 
cereals just after the war, prior to the Green Revolution, and in 1990. There are obvious problems with 
this figure, particularly in that it asks us to compare, say, wheat produced extensively in the United States 
and Russia, with intensively produced, irrigated wheat grown in Mexico, and all cereals with rice grown 
under garden conditions in the Far East. Still the figure does convey an impression of what has been 
accomplished in various parts ofthe world and what might be achieved under more optimal conditions. 
The impact ofthe Green Revolution on yields in the developing countries is strikingly evident, as is 
the fact that yields in many parts of the world still have a long way to go before reaching the average 
attained in more advanced countries. And who can say what wonders biotechnology may bring, other than 
that they will be substantiaL 
Also worth noting are the factors by which cereal output increased between 1950 and 1990: 3.2 
times in the developing countries as a whole, 5-fold in China, 3.7 times in India, and 3.4 times in Latin 
America. 
My guess is that the world will somehow manage to soldier on. Exports from the developed 
countries will doubtless grow and American farmers in particular will increasingly supply feedstuffs to the 
•Asian and Latin American markets. 
If problems emerge, they will likely be centered on Africa, the Middle East, and India. Problems in 
Africa will be self-inflicted. I have been visiting that region for over 30 years and never cease to be 
impressed by the potential of its untapped resources. The Middle East is another matter. Its agricultural 
potential is Quite limited and I take comfort in the fact that its energy surpluses are obvious items to be 
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Table 7. World Population and Computed Direct and Indirect Energy Utilization,
 
1985, 2000, 2025, and 2050, By Region 
POPULAnON (Billion People) 
1985 Increase 2000 Increase 2025 Increase 2050 
~ ~ .. ~ 
.. ~ 
World - Total 4.84 1.25X 6.09 1.3X 8.12 1.5X 8.91 
Developed 1.18 0 1.19 0 1.36 0 1.25 
Developing 3.67 l.36X 4.90 I.4X 6.76 1.6X 7.66 
Latin America .40 1.25X .51 I.4X .69 1.6X .81 
E & SEAsia 1.53 1.27X 1.88 1.2X 2.31 1.3X 2.37 
South Asia 1.06 1.36X 1.50 I.4X 2.04 I.4X 2.17 
SW Asia & N Africa .24 1.5X .34 1.6X .55 2.3X .79 
Sub-Saharan Africa .44 2.0X .67 1.7X 1.17 2.3X 1.52 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT ENERGY UTILIZATION (Billion Metric Tons Grain Equivalent) 
1985 
~ 
Increase 2000 
• .. 
.. 
Increase 2025 
~ 
Increase 2050 
~ 
World - Total 2,606 1.5X 3,803 1.6X 6,258 1.9X 7,316 
Developed 1,159 0 1,318 0 1,514 0 1,383 
Developing 1,447 1.7X 2,485 1.9X 4,744 2.4X 5,933 
Latin America 237 2.0X 470 1.6X 761 1.9X 898 
E & SEAsia 638 1.6X 1,005 2.0X 2,019 2.IX 2,078 
South Asia 322 1.6X 531 1.6X 850 2.3X 1,203 
SW Asia & N Africa 120 2.0X 247 2.4X 606 3.6X 879 
Sub-Saharan Africa 130 1.8X 230 2.2X 508 3.8X 875 • 
... 
Data are from Appendix Table 2. 
N
 
N
 
Figure 7. Indices ofTotal and Per Capita Food Production. 1951-1993 (1969-71 = 100) 
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Data from FAO. 1994. Index Numbers: Production. AGROSTAT-PC 3.0 [Computer data set). Available on diskettes from FAO. Rome. Italy. 
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FIGURE 8. WORLD PRODUCTION, AREA, AND YIELD OF CEREALS, 
AVERAGE 1948-52, 1965-69, AND 1988-92.* 
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exchanged for its deficiencies in food production. With such a mutually advantageous basis for trade, the 
conflict between Islam and Christendom envisioned by many need not take place. 
As to Mexico, it matters little that it may never be able to achieve self-sufficiency in food. When I 
wrote 30 years ago that its salvation lay in closer economic integration with the United States, my Latino 
students laughed. NAFTA is an arrangement whose wisdom amazes us all. 
•
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Appendix Table 1. Dietary Indicators and Purchasing-Power-Parity GOP Per Capita,
 
Selected Countries, About 1965, 1979, 1975, 1980, and 1985
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Dietary indicators are: Kcal--per capita daily energy availabilities; SS (%)--percent of calories from starchy 
staples; Animal (%)--percent of calories from animal products, and are calculated from FAO. 1991. Food 
Balance Sheets, 1984-86 Avuage. Rome. 
Purchasing-power-parity GDP per capita figures are expressed in 1985 U.S. dolJars and are from Penn World 
Table (Mark 55). 1993. Annex to Summers, Robert and A. Heston. 1991. "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): 
An Expanded Set of International Comparisons. 1950-1988: Quarterly Journal of Economics. May. 
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Appendix Table 2. Demand Projection Work Sheet 
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